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Abstract
This paper analyzes optimal foreign aid policy in a neoclassical framework
with a conflict of interest between the donor and the recipient government.
Aid conditionality is modelled as a limited enforceable contract. We define
conditional aid policy to be self-enforcing if, at any point in time, the con-
ditions imposed on aid funds are supportable by the threat of a permanent
aid cutoff from then onward. Quantitative results show that the effective-
ness of unconditional aid is low while self-enforcing conditional aid strongly
stimulates the economy. However, increasing the welfare of the poor comes
at high cost: to ensure aid effectiveness, less democratic political regimes
receive permanently larger aid funds.
JEL: E13, F35, O11, O19.
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1 Introduction
Foreign aid has been a substantial source of income in African countries. The
stated intention of development assistance programs is to reduce poverty and
to promote economic growth. However, the stagnating growth pattern in
African countries calls the effectiveness of aid into question.
This paper develops a theoretical model to analyze how foreign aid should
be optimally designed to stimulate developing economies. We take into ac-
count that there is a conflict of interest between the donor and the recipient
government. Instead of implementing economic policies that coincide with
the donor’s intention, the recipient government may follow ‘bad’ policies and
use aid funds e.g. to assist political supporters or to finance military inter-
ventions. To prevent the government from doing so, donors often impose
conditions that specify how foreign aid funds should be allocated. However,
since the recipient country is sovereign and aid funds are fungible, donors
face the problem that the government may not be willing to keep the condi-
tions. Therefore, donors should choose aid policies that induce the recipient
government to cooperate and to devote aid funds to effective policies. In our
theoretical model aid conditionality is described as an imperfectly enforce-
able contract between the donor and the recipient country. To ensure that
the recipient government fulfills the conditions, the donor threatens with aid
sanctions. We define conditional aid policy to be self-enforcing if, at any
point in time, the conditions are supportable by the threat of a permanent
aid cutoff from then onward.
We develop a neoclassical framework that allows us to analyze aid effec-
tiveness in the light of different political regimes in the recipient country.
The government of the developing economy finances unproductive govern-
ment consumption by raising distortionary taxes on households’ income and
by using aid funds. Taking the tax policy as given, Ramsey style households
make optimal consumption and investment choices. The donor decides about
costly aid transfers and cares solely about the welfare of the households. In
contrast, government’s preferences are assumed to depend on unproductive
government consumption. Our specification of government’s preferences uses
a weight on households’ welfare to measure benevolence. Political regimes
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associated with a low weight on households’ utility and a high valuation of
unproductive government consumption are interpreted as non-democratic.
Given the recipient’s political regime, the donor designs aid conditionality as
a contract: the donor offers to transfer aid funds and, in return, expects the
government to reduce the tax burden of the households. We assume that the
conditions, i.e. the tax cuts, are feasible, if they are enforceable by the threat
of a permanent aid cutoff from then onward.
The theoretical literature on aid effectiveness is limited. There are two
main directions of research. Studies of the first direction focus primarily on
the link of foreign aid and growth, e.g. Chenery and Strout (1966), Chatter-
jee, Sakoulis and Turnovsky (2003) and Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp (2004).
Svensson (1999) and Boone (1996) study the impact of unconditional aid
in the presence of different political institutions.1 The second direction
uses game-theoretic models to study aid effectiveness in the light of incen-
tive compatibility, moral hazard and informational problems, e.g. Cordella,
Dell’Ariccia and Kletzer (2003), Kletzer (2005), Federico (2001), Svensson
(2000a, 2000b, 2003), Murshed and Sen (1995), Azam and Laffon (2003) and
Tornell and Lane (1999).
This paper attempts to link the two directions of research by analyzing
aid effectiveness and incentive compatibility in a neoclassical framework. We
follow Cordella et al. (2003) and Kletzer (2005) who model conditional aid as
an imperfectly enforceable contract in a repeated agency model. Consider-
ing an endowment economy, Cordella et al. (2003) focus on the connection of
imperfectly enforceable conditional aid and debt relief while Kletzer (2005)
stresses the credibility of aid sanctions. In contrast, we study the impact of
imperfectly enforceable conditional aid on tax policies and capital accumula-
tion in the presence of different political regimes. Our neoclassical framework
is similar to the one in Boone (1996), however, he does not analyze the impact
of conditional aid but focuses on unconditional aid.
In order to study steady state distributions and transition paths we solve
the model numerically using projection methods based on Judd (1992, 1998)
1Most papers in this area of research focus on distortions within the recipient country.
One notable exception is Dalgaard (2004) who analyzes to what extent donor policies
influence the effectiveness of aid.
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and Christiano and Fisher (2000). Following Marcet and Marimon (1992,
1998) we introduce an additional co-state variable that measures the binding
pattern of the enforcement constraint.2
In accordance to the results in Boone (1996), we find that aid effectiveness
is very low if aid is unconditionally transferred. Steady state distributions
are the same or similar to those that arise if no aid is given to the coun-
try. The less democratic the political regime the less foreign aid is used to
decrease distortionary taxes. Instead, aid funds increase the size of the re-
cipient government. Imposing conditionality strongly boosts the economy
as considerable tax cuts increase the incentives to invest in capital. House-
hold consumption rises substantially and welfare gains are large. However,
increasing household consumption comes at high cost, particularly in less
democratic political regimes. To ensure the enforceability of aid condition-
ality, the donor has to pay large amounts of aid. If aid transfers are not
sufficiently high, a permanent aid cutoff does not pose a severe threat to
the recipient government. Since the capital stock built up so far cannot be
seized, the government has no incentive to fulfill the conditions imposed by
the donor. Hence, tax cuts are not implemented and aid has no or only mi-
nor effect on the welfare of the poor. We find that the less democratic the
political regime the lower are the incentives to implement economic policies
that coincide with the donor’s intention. Consequently, to ensure aid effec-
tiveness, the donor has to transfer permanently more aid to countries that
suffer from less democratic regimes.
Remarkably, the pattern of self-enforcing conditional aid crucially de-
pends on the initial capital stock in the recipient country. Suppose the initial
capital stock is given by the steady state that occurs if no aid is given to the
developing economy. Then optimal self-enforcing conditional aid is charac-
terized by large transfers in the early periods to stimulate the economy. As
capital grows, the amount of aid decreases. Now suppose a sudden switch
to a less democratic political regime takes place, such that the initial capital
stock is larger than the steady state that occurs if no aid is given to the
2In Giovannetti, Marcet and Marimon (1993) the theoretical model developed in Marcet
and Marimon (1992) is applied to the case of Africa. Other papers that apply the solution
approach of Marcet and Marimon (1992, 1998) are e.g. Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini
(2001), Kehoe and Perri (2002) and Klein and Rios-Rull (2003).
3
new government. How should optimal self-enforcing conditional aid policy
respond if the intention is to improve the welfare of the poor? Since the
initial capital stock is high, a permanent aid cutoff does not pose a threat to
the recipient government. Moreover, foreign aid funds increase the capital
stock in such a way that the punishment threat gets even less severe. Hence,
the recipient government has high incentives to break the aid contract. In
order to prevent the government from doing so, the donor has to temporarily
raise foreign aid funds with increasing capital. This counter-intuitive effect
is particularly pronounced in non-democratic political regimes.
While the theoretical literature on aid effectiveness, economic policies and
growth is limited, the empirical literature is evolving quickly. The extensive
empirical debate about the interaction of foreign aid and economic policies
in recipient countries is summarized in Section 2. Moreover, some empir-
ical facts concerning foreign aid flows and economic growth are discussed
with special attention to African countries. The remainder of this paper is
structured as follows. In Section 3 a neoclassical framework is developed
that considers different political regimes and allows us to analyze the effec-
tiveness of aid programs in the light of enforceability problems. Section 4
deals with the numerical solution. In Section 5 we analyze quantitatively
the effectiveness of unconditional and conditional aid by studying transition
paths and steady state distributions. Finally, Section 6 concludes with policy
implications.
2 Empirical Evidence on Aid Effectiveness
To set the stage, we briefly summarize the empirical evidence and the econo-
metric literature concerning the following questions: How do African coun-
tries perform in terms of economic growth? How large are foreign aid flows to
African countries and how effective are they? Do the data show a significant
interaction of foreign aid effectiveness and recipient’s economic policies?
2.1 Foreign Aid and Growth
The left panel of Figure 1 shows the pattern of average annual per capita
GDP in constant US $ (2000 = 100) of 32 African countries for the time
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period 1972 to 2000. The annual data series for GDP, price indices and
population are taken from the International Monetary Fund. First note the
low level of per capita GDP. Moreover, though there are short periods of
growth (1975-1980 and 1985 to 1990), the overall average growth pattern
across African countries is one of stagnation or decline (see also Ndulu and
O’Connell (1999)). The bad growth performance of African countries has led
to massive aid programs with the stated goal to reduce poverty. The right
panel of Figure 1 shows that average foreign aid funds given to 35 African
countries measured in percent of recipient’s GDP have been increasing until
1995. As measure of foreign aid we use the definition of the Development
Assistance Committee of the OECD that views aid as the sum of nonmilitary
grants and concessional loans net of repayment of previous aid loans, called
total net Official Development Assistance (ODA). Remarkably, there is a
huge drop in foreign aid flows from 1995 on. Roughly at the same time,
critical studies on aid effectiveness attracted attention, like e.g. Boone (1996).
Table 1 takes a closer look at individual countries and distinguishes be-
tween total ODA and the grant component of ODA. The numbers vary be-
tween 2 and 30 percent of recipient’s GDP. On average the African countries
in our sample received official development assistance of about 11 percent of
GDP in the time period from 1972 to 2000. The larger part was given as
grants. About 37 percent of total net ODA were provided by multilateral
donors and the remaining part by bilateral donors. These numbers indicate
that from 1972 to 2000 foreign aid was a substantial source of income for
African countries. The last two columns of Table 1 compare average annual
growth rates from 1972 to 2000 across countries. Though most of the African
countries in this sample received non-negligible amounts of foreign aid, their
GDP was declining or stagnating. Two notable exceptions are Botswana
and Mauritius who experienced substantial growth in both, GDP and per
capita GDP. Botswana can be viewed as a success story of foreign aid since
total net ODA declined from around 20 percent in 1972 to 5 percent in 2000.
Mauritius shows high average annual growth rates, too, however, foreign aid
assistance was low throughout the period.
These stylized facts call the effectiveness of aid into question. In an influ-
ential econometric study Boone (1996) confirms the basic message of Figure
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1 and Table 1: using a variety of macroeconomic variables and development
indicators he does not find any significant positive effect of foreign aid on
investment or growth. However, he does not control for economic policies in
the recipient countries.
2.2 Foreign Aid and Recipient’s Policies
It has been argued that foreign aid effectiveness crucially depends on the
political institutions and economic policies in recipient countries. A measure
of political liberties used in the empirical literature is the so-called Gastil
index provided by the House of Freedom. To construct the index different
categories are scored: political rights, civil liberties, the rule of law, human
rights and personal and economic rights. The examined countries are then
given scores and rated as ‘free’ (score 1-2.5), ‘partly free’ (score 3.5-5.5)
or ‘not free’ (score 5.5-7). Alesina and Dollar (2000) call countries with a
Gastil index larger than 5 ‘less democratic’. Table 2 lists the Gastil index for
the countries in our sample. Benin, Burkina Faso, Central Africa, Gambia,
Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Malawi and the Seychelles are rated as ‘not free’ until
the 1990s and as ‘partly free’ from then on. All other African countries in
our sample are rated as ‘not free’ or ‘less democratic’ during the whole time
period. Notable exceptions are Botswana and Mauritius who are classified as
‘free’ and are also the two countries in the sample who show a good growth
performance.
The empirical literature concerning the connection between foreign aid
effectiveness and recipient’s economic policies is large and controversial. One
influential paper is Burnside and Dollar (2000) who analyze the relation-
ship between foreign aid, economic policy and growth of per capita GDP. In
contrast to Boone (1996), Burnside and Dollar (2000) include measures of
institutional and policy distortions and find that the interaction of foreign
aid and sound economic policies has a positive significant relationship with
growth. This result is often cited by aid agencies as a general argument in
favor of increasing foreign aid. However, several studies followed that use
variations of the specification of Burnside and Dollar and either confirm or
reject the finding of a positive significant interaction between foreign aid and
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good economic policies, e.g. Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001), Dalgaard and
Hansen (2001), Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001), Lensink and White (2001)
and Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002). Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2003)
and Easterly (2003) strongly criticize Burnside and Dollar (2000) by finding
an insignificant effect when using the same specification but adding more
data that have become available by the time. Recently, Burnside and Dollar
(2004) find that the interaction of aid and policies exhibits a robust positive
relationship with growth when using a new data set focusing only on the
1990s.
Alesina and Weder (2002) and Dollar and Levin (2004) follow a different
route and analyze whether there is selectivity in giving foreign aid to coun-
tries with sound economic policies. The latter show that aid was allocated
indiscriminately before 1989 and argue that selectivity is a recent phenomena
while Alesina and Weder (2002) find no evidence that less corrupt govern-
ments receive more foreign aid. Another direction of the empirical research
is whether foreign aid has a beneficial impact on recipient’s policies. Dollar
and Svensson (2000) and the references therein do not find robust evidence
that foreign aid has a positive impact on institutions or reforms.
To summarize, the data indicate that foreign aid is an important source
of income in African countries, however, the effectiveness of aid programs
seems to be low. Most of the African countries in our sample perform badly
in terms of democracy. Yet, there is no empirical evidence that donors show
selectivity in giving foreign aid to more democratic countries. Moreover,
there is considerable uncertainty about the connection of aid effectiveness
and recipient’s economic policies.
3 The Model
Based on the empirical evidence, there is an ongoing major debate about
how aid agencies should design aid programs. Rather than drawing on em-
pirical arguments, the objective of our study is to contribute to the debate
by theoretically deriving optimal foreign aid policy. Our theoretical model
is based on three major assumptions. First, the intention of foreign aid pro-
grams is poverty reduction. It may be interesting to analyze objectives that
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are more of political nature, however, this is beyond the scope of this paper.
Second, recipient countries may have non-democratic political regimes such
that a conflict of interest between the donor and the recipient government is
generated. Third, foreign aid flows do not change the institutions in the re-
cipient country, i.e. donors take the political regime as given when designing
aid policy.
3.1 The Environment
We consider a developing economy inhabited by a large number of infinitely-
lived households who maximize utility. There is a government who finances
its unproductive consumption by raising distortionary taxes on households’
income and by using foreign aid funds.
Preferences of the representative household are given by
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ch,t), 0 < β < 1, (1)
where ch,t denotes household consumption at time t. The utility function
u(ch,t) satisfies uch(ch,t) > 0 and uchch(ch,t) < 0. uch and uchch denote the
first and second derivatives of u with respect to household consumption.
The households’ budget constraint is given by
ch,t + kt = (1− τt)yt + (1− δ)kt−1, (2)
k−1 > 0. The capital stock at time t is denoted by kt, production yt is given
by a constant returns to scale production function, yt = F (kt−1, nt), and τt
denotes the income tax rate raised by the government. 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 is the
capital depreciation rate. In the following we normalize labor nt ≡ 1, for all
t, such that F (kt−1, 1) ≡ f(kt).
Preferences of the government are given by
∞∑
t=0
βt[α u(ch,t) + (1− α) v(cg,t)], (3)
where the utility function v satisfies vcg(cg,t) > 0 and vcgcg(cg,t) < 0. vcg and
vcgcg denote the first and second derivatives of v with respect to government
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consumption. We label unproductive government consumption by cg,t and
interpret it as e.g. expenditures supporting the political elite. α measures
the benevolence of the government and is interpreted as an indicator of the
political regime in the recipient country. Low values of α imply that the
welfare of the households is of minor importance to the government. We call
the associated political regime non-democratic since the government puts
large weight on the utility of unproductive government expenditures that
are financed by taxes on households’ income. In contrast, high values of α
characterize benevolent political regimes. Note that the political regime is
assumed to be exogenous and cannot be influenced by foreign aid funds. The
government’s budget constraint is given by
cg,t = τtyt + at, (4)
where at ≥ 0 denotes aid transfers given by the donor.
The representative donor makes costly aid transfers. The donor’s prefer-
ences are dependent on the welfare of the households and are given by
∞∑
t=0
βt[u(ch,t) + h(at)], (5)
where the cost function h(at) satisfies h(at) < 0, ha(at) < 0 and haa(at) < 0.
ha and haa denote the first and second derivatives of h with respect to aid.
3.2 Unconditional Foreign Aid
Without any conditions imposed on foreign aid funds the recipient govern-
ment chooses taxes and government consumption, such that government’s
preferences are maximized subject to the government budget constraint and
the optimal decision rules of the households.
Given taxes and government consumption households maximize (1) sub-
ject to their budget constraint (2). The optimal decision rules of the house-
holds are given by:
uch(ch,t)
β
= uch(ch,t+1)R(cg,t+1, kt, at+1) (6)
R(cg,t+1, kt, at+1) =
(
1− cg,t+1 − at+1
f(kt)
)
fk(kt) + 1− δ (7)
ch,t + cg,t + kt = f(kt−1) + (1− δ)kt−1 + at. (8)
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(6) is the usual Euler equation that connects the marginal rate of substi-
tution between consumption today and tomorrow with the rate of return











βt[α u(ch,t) + (1− α) v(cg,t)] (9)
s.t.
(6), (7), and (8)
given k−1 > 0.
3.3 Conditional Foreign Aid as Self-Enforcing Contract
Donors want to choose an aid policy that induces the government to devote
aid funds to policies that coincide with the donor’s intention. One way to
ensure the implementation of effective policies is to impose conditions on for-
eign aid funds. We define aid conditionality as a contract between the donor
and the recipient country that specifies foreign aid funds and tax policies in
such a way that the donor’s preferences are maximized subject to the opti-
mal decision rules of the households and the government budget constraints.
However, the contract is imperfectly enforceable since the sovereign recipient
government can always dishonor the conditions and implement ineffective tax
policies. We assume that in this case the donor responds with aid sanctions.
In the following we assume that conditional foreign aid policy constitutes
a self-enforcing contract between the donor and the recipient government
only if, at any point in time, the conditions are supportable by the threat of
permanent aid sanctions from then onwards. Aid conditions are defined to
be feasible only if, at any point in time, the government’s utility of fulfilling
the conditions is larger than the utility in case of a permanent aid cutoff.
Note that since a permanent aid cutoff is the worst possible scenario for the
recipient government, the associated self-enforcing allocation is the best the
donor can achieve.
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The self-enforcing contract is defined to be given by the solution to the
following maximization problem of the donor:
max
{ch,t, cg,t, kt, at}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0




βj[α u(ch,t+j) + (1− α) v(cg,t+j)] ≥ D(kt−1) (11)
(6), (7) and (8)
given k−1 > 0. D(kt−1) =
∑∞
j=0 β
j[αu(c̃h,t+j)+(1−α)v(c̃g,t+j)] is the govern-
ment’s utility if no foreign aid funds are given from t onwards. {c̃h,t+j, c̃g,t+j}∞j=0
solve the government maximization problem (9) under the assumption that
at+j = 0 ∀ j ≥ 0. Note that even if the consequence of default is a perma-
nent cutoff of development assistance, the recipient country is still endowed
with the capital that has been built up using past aid payments. Hence,
the righthand-side of (11) depends on the capital stock kt−1. The solution to
(10) is an allocation {ch,t, cg,t, kt}∞t=0 and policy actions {at, τt}∞t=0 that can be
interpreted as the outcome of aid conditionality. The donor offers to transfer
at at time t and in return expects the recipient government to implement the
fiscal policy action τt that is associated with the allocation {ch,t, cg,t, kt}∞t=0.
The contract is self-enforcing since (11) has to be fulfilled: foreign aid con-
tracts are only feasible if, at any point in time, they are enforceable by the
threat of permanent aid cutoff from then onwards.
3.4 Analysis
The maximization problem (10) contains the enforcement constraint (11)
that includes future realizations of the decision variables. To solve the prob-
lem we follow Marcet and Marimon (1992, 1998) and introduce an additional
co-state variable that measures the binding pattern of the enforcement con-
straint:
µt = µt−1 + γt, µ−1 = 0. (12)
γt ≥ 0 denotes the Lagrange-multiplier on the enforcement constraint. If the
enforcement constraint is not binding at time t, γt = 0 and µt is determined
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by past binding patterns. If the enforcement constraint is binding at time t,
the multiplier γt is strictly greater than zero and µt increases. Setting up the
Lagrangian, using (12) and simple algebra the donor’s maximization problem




{ch,t, cg,t, kt, at}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βt[u(ch,t) + h(at) (13)
+µt (α u(ch,t) + (1− α) v(cg,t))
−γtD(kt−1)]
s.t.
(6), (7), (8) and (12).
This formulation shows clearly that the additional co-state variable µt enters
as a weight on government’s preferences.
Given kt−1 the allocation {c̃h,t+j, c̃g,t+j, k̃t+j}∞j=0 of the outside option
D(kt−1) solves the government’s maximization problem (9) and satisfies the
following optimality conditions with ãt+j = 0 ∀ j ≥ 0:
ζ̃t+j = αuch(c̃h,t+j) + uchch(c̃h,t+j)
(
λ̃t+j−1R(c̃g,t+j, k̃t+j−1, ãt+j)− λ̃t+j
)
(14)





fk(k̃t+j) + 1− δ
)
+λ̃t+juch(c̃h,t+j+1)Rk̃(k̃t+j, c̃g,t+j+1, ãt+j+1) (16)
and (6) to (8). λ̃t+j denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the Euler equation of
the households (6) and enters as a state variable. ζ̃t+j is the multiplier associ-
ated with the resource constraint. Rc̃g and Rk̃ denote the partial derivatives
of R with respect to c̃g and k̃, respectively.
The optimal allocation associated with the self-enforcing foreign aid con-
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tract (13) satisfies the optimality conditions
ζt = (1 + αµt)uch(ch,t) + uchch(ch,t)
(
λt−1R(kt−1, cg,t, at)− λt
)
(17)
ζt = (1− α)µtvcg(cg,t) + λt−1uch(ch,t)Rcg(kt−1, cg,t, at) (18)





fk(kt) + 1− δ
)





βj[αu(ch,t+j) + (1− α)v(cg,t+j)]−D(kt−1)
)
(21)
together with (6) to (8) and (12). Ra denotes the partial derivative of R
with respect to a. λt denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the Euler equation
and measures its tightness. ζt is the Lagrange multiplier of the resource
constraint. (21) is the complementary slackness condition.
Note that the first order conditions of the donor with respect to ch,t and
cg,t given by (17) and (18) are similar to those of the government (14) and
(15). They differ only in the weight on households’ utility u(ch,t) and gov-
ernment’s utility v(cg,t). Initially the donor puts full weight on households’
utility while government’s preferences are characterized by a weight α on
u(ch,t) and (1 − α) on v(cg,t). The donor’s weight on households’ and gov-
ernment’s utility is dependent on the co-state variable µt that determines
the binding pattern of the enforcement constraint. Consider first the donor’s
optimality condition (17) with respect to ch,t. Optimal household consump-
tion connects the cost ζt of a marginal increase in consumption with the
weighted marginal utility (1 + αµt)uch(ch,t).
3 Assume that the enforcement
constraint is binding, γt > 0 (see the complementary slackness condition
(21)). Then µt and, hence, the weight (1 + αµt) increase which implies that
the donor raises ch,t. Now consider the donor’s optimality condition (18) with
respect to cg,t. Optimal government consumption satisfies that the cost ζt of
a marginal increase in consumption is dependent on the weighted marginal
utility (1−α)µtvcg(cg,t). If the government has an incentive to default on the
aid conditions, µt increases and a larger weight has to be assigned to v(cg,t).
3The remaining term of (17) is related to the tightness of the Euler equation.
13
How strongly household consumption and government consumption are af-
fected by µt depends on the value of α. Consider the extreme case α = 0
and the enforcement constraint is binding. Then µt enters solely as a weight
on government utility: government consumption has to increase in order to
decrease the inventive to break the aid contract. Substituting equation (18)
in (19) and using Rcg = −Ra yields −ha(at) = (1 − α)µtvcg(cg,t) which de-
termines optimal foreign aid funds by equating marginal costs of aid and
weighted marginal utility of the government. It is evident that the donor has
to adjust aid funds to increase government consumption if the enforcement
constraint is binding. Foreign aid becomes more costly to the donor because
higher government consumption has to be accepted to ensure the enforce-
ability of aid conditionality. Equation (20) is the first order condition with
respect to capital. A marginal increase in capital raises the outside option
in t + 1 and influences the binding pattern of the enforcement constraint in
t + 1 which is captured by the term −γt+1Dk(kt).
Given an initial capital stock k−1 and given (12), the co-state variable µt
grows until it reaches its steady state µ, such that the enforcement constraint
(11) is satisfied and γ = 0. Since the model assumes no exogenous growth,
the steady state is characterized by a constant weight µ, a constant allocation
(ch, cg, k) and constant policy (τ , a) that fulfill the optimality conditions (17)
to (21) and the constraints (6) to (8).
In the following we analyze transition paths and steady state distribu-
tions and study the impact of unconditional and conditional aid in different
political regimes in the recipient country. Since the constraints (6) to (8),
the law of motion for the co-state variable (12) and the optimality conditions
(17) to (21) form a system of highly nonlinear equations that depend on the
state variables kt, λt and µt, we solve the model numerically.
4 Numerical Solution
4.1 Functional Forms and Calibration
In our numerical simulations we consider different political regimes, α = 0.3,
α = 0.5 and α = 0.7, where the latter denotes the most benevolent.
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We assume logarithmic utility functions: u(·) = v(·) = log(·). The pro-
duction function is considered to be f(kt−1) = νkθt−1, ν > 0. 0 < θ < 1
denotes the capital share. The donor’s cost function h(at) is assumed to be
quadratic, h(at) = −κa2t , where κ > 0 is a parameter.
We calibrate the model on an annual basis and assume values that are
consistent with the usual neoclassical growth model: β = 0.96, θ = 0.3,
δ = 0.10. κ is chosen such that for α = 0.5 the steady state foreign aid share
is 10 percent which is the median in the data. Calibrating κ differently leads
to qualitatively similar results. We choose ν by normalizing the model such
that for α = 0.5 steady state production under aid autarky equals 1.
4.2 Numerical Algorithm
The numerical algorithm makes use of projection methods particularly well
described in Judd (1992, 1998). In order to appropriately take into account
the occasionally binding enforcement constraint, we follow Christiano and
Fisher (2000) and use some parameterized functions of the state variables to
approximate those parts of the optimality conditions that are determined by
future realizations of the decision variables. The method is related to the
parameterized expectations approach by Marcet and Marimon (1992). The
basic structure of the algorithm is as follows.
Define the state s = (k, λ, µ). Let the optimal decision rules for capital,
private and government consumption, foreign aid and Lagrange multipliers
be a set of time invariant functions of s satisfying the conditions (6) to (8),
(12) and (17) to (21). Define the future state s′ = (k′(s), λ′(s), µ′(s)) = g(s).
Consider the optimality conditions that include future realizations of the
decision variables (6), (20) and the enforcement constraint (11) and define
the right-hand sides by m1, m2 and m3 as follows:
uch(ch(s))
β
= m1(s, g(s)) (22)
ζ(s)
β
= m2(s, g(s)) (23)
α u(ch(s)) + (1− α) v(cg(s)) ≥ m3(s, g(s)). (24)
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Our numerical approach assumes that mi can be approximated by some
parameterized function êχi of the state variables
mi(s, g(s)) ≈ exp[êχi(s)] ∀ i. (25)
The functions êχi are good approximations if the residuals
Residuali = exp[êχi(s)]−mi(s, g(s))
are close to zero ∀ i.
Given a fixed set of grid points and given an initial guess for the param-
eter vectors χ = (χ1, χ2, χ3), inserting (25) in (22) to (24) can be used to
determine the time invariant policy functions ĝχ that are dependent on χ.
New parameter vectors χ′ are found by performing linear regressions:
êχ′i(s) = log[mi(s, ĝχ(s))] ∀ i.
The algorithm is iterated until the parameter vectors converge: χ′i ≈ χi, ∀ i.
In practice we take Chebyshev polynomials as approximating functions
and use the Chebyshev nodes as grid points. The numerical advantages
of Chebyshev polynomials are described in Judd (1992). Christiano and
Fisher (2000) point out that the method can be viewed as a weighted residual
method. Here the Chebyshev polynomials are the approximating functions
and the collocation method is used as the weighting method.
To correctly take into account the complementary slackness condition, we
follow Marcet and Marimon (1992) and proceed as follows. At each iteration,
in a first step, we assume that the enforcement constraint is not binding,
γ(s) = 0, and calculate ch(s) and ζ(s) by using the approximating functions
êχ1(s) and êχ2(s). cg(s) is calculated by using the first order condition (18).
Next, it is checked whether the enforcement constraint is satisfied. If the
enforcement constraint is not satisfied, we recalculate cg(s) and γ(s) by using
αu(ch(s)) + (1 − α)v(cg(s)) = êχ3(s) and (18), respectively. a(s), k′(s) and
λ′(s) are then calculated using the first order conditions (17), (19) and the
constraints constraints (7) and (8).
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5 Quantitative Properties of Aid Policies
We structure the discussion of the results as follows. In Section 5.1 we first
analyze the economic outcome of different political regimes that receive no
development assistance. Section 5.2 studies the characteristics of optimal
foreign aid policy if the donor is able to perfectly enforce cg,t = 0, inde-
pendently of the political regime. This is our benchmark aid policy since
this is the best that the donor can achieve. In Section 5.3 we discuss the
impact of the benchmark aid policy if aid funds are unconditionally given
to the developing economies. We show that aid effectiveness is low because
the recipient government implements policies that do not coincide with the
donor’s intention. Section 5.4 derives aid conditionality that is self-enforcing.
In this case aid effectiveness can be greatly improved. However, it comes at
a high cost since permanently large aid funds have to be transferred to the
developing economies. In Section 5.5 we analyze the characteristics of op-
timal self-enforcing conditional aid if a sudden political regime switch takes
place in the recipient country.
5.1 No Foreign Aid
To study the effectiveness of foreign aid, we first analyze the situation of
a developing country that receives no foreign aid funds. We focus on the
impact of different political regimes on the overall economy.
Without any development assistance the government in the developing
country chooses income tax rates and government consumption by solving
the maximization problem (9) with at = 0 for all t. We consider different
political regimes and summarize the steady state values of the main economic
indicators in Table 3, Panel I. In the following we refer to this scenario as
the ‘No Aid Steady State’.
First, consider a government that puts a large weight on the welfare of
the households, α = 0.7, but also finances some unproductive government
consumption by raising a distortionary tax on households’ income. In the
steady state the income tax rate amounts to 24 percent to finance a 24 per-
cent government consumption share. The household consumption share and
the investment share are 60 and 16 percent, respectively. A government that
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puts a lower weight on the welfare of the households, α = 0.5, increases its
government consumption share by increasing the income tax rate to 39 per-
cent. The households have lower incentives to invest, such that the steady
state capital stock decreases from 1.79 to 1.28. In the least benevolent politi-
cal regime, α = 0.3, income taxes of 55 percent decrease the capital stock and
consumption to a very low level. This political scenario is characterized by a
government consumption share that is larger than the private consumption
share.
The results indicate that developing countries with non-democratic polit-
ical regimes suffer from low levels of capital and consumption due to strong
distortions generated by the government. In the following we analyze to what
extent foreign aid policy helps to improve the economic situation of develop-
ing countries. We assume that the donor observes the ‘No Aid Steady State’
capital stocks as the initial situations.
5.2 Benchmark Aid Policy
We consider the following scenario as the benchmark of optimal foreign aid
policy and refer to this scenario as ‘Aid Policy A’. Suppose, at any point
in time, the donor can perfectly enforce cg,t = 0 in the recipient country.
Given the ‘No Aid Steady State’ capital stocks as initial situation and given
cg,t = 0, what are the characteristics of optimal foreign aid policy?
To design optimal aid policy the donor maximizes his preferences (5)
subject to the optimality conditions of the households (6), (7) and (8). Since
cg,t = 0, the tax on income is given by τt = −at/yt and can be understood as
a subsidy or as a productivity increase. Figure 2 plots optimal aid transfers
and the associated tax policy. We show the level of tax rates, the tax cut
in percentage points relative to the ‘No Aid Steady State’ tax rate and the
tax as percentage deviations from the ‘No Aid Steady State’ tax. Moreover,
household consumption, government consumption, capital and production
are presented as percentage deviations from the ‘No Aid Steady State’.
The graphs show that optimal foreign aid policy is given by temporary
transfers to stimulate the economy on its transition path to the steady state
associated with cg = 0. The amount of aid yields a subsidy that can be inter-
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preted as a three, two and one percent increase in productivity for α = 0.3,
α = 0.5 and α = 0.7, respectively. The subsidy raises households’ incentives
to invest in capital. As capital grows, aid funds revert to zero, such that in
the long-run τ = 0. The economy with the least benevolent political regime,
α = 0.3, receives the largest development assistance because it is the poorest
country with the lowest initial capital stock. The economy characterized by
α = 0.7 gets low development assistance since the ‘No Aid Steady State’
capital stock is close to the efficient one. The tax cuts in percentage points
are larger than the ‘No Aid Steady State’ taxes for all values of α because
foreign aid funds are used to turn the tax into a subsidy. Since the economy
associated with α = 0.3 receives the largest payment and the tax cut is the
biggest, the capital stock increases most in terms of percentage deviations
from the ‘No Aid Steady State’. Household consumption can be consider-
ably increased. Because the donor can enforce cg,t = 0, independently of
the political regime, the three economies converge to the same new steady
state summarized in Panel II of Table 3. The steady state is characterized
by a private consumption share of 79 percent and an investment share of 21
percent.
Panel I of Table 4 presents the impact of ‘Aid Policy A’ on households’
welfare given cg,t = 0. For reasons of interpretation we use compensating
variations to formulate differences in lifetime utility and express the welfare
gain in terms of percentage deviation in certainty-equivalence consumption
relative to the ‘No Aid Steady State’. The welfare gain is contrasted with
the costs of foreign aid funds given by h(at). While the costs of aid are
minimal, the welfare gain is substantial. As an example take the economy
characterized by α = 0.5: the welfare gain is equivalent to increasing ‘No
Aid Steady State’ consumption by 35 percent. The welfare gain is larger for
lower values of α since initially the economies suffer from lower capital stock.
5.3 Unconditional Aid Policy
Because there is a conflict of interest between the donor and the government,
it is likely that the government does not implement the tax policy as described
in the previous section. In this section we analyze how different political
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regimes respond to ‘Aid Policy A’.
Suppose at time t = 0 the donor commits to unconditionally transfer aid
funds described by ‘Aid Policy A’. The recipient government takes foreign
aid as given and chooses tax rates by solving the maximization problem (9).
Figure 3 shows the tax policy and the responses of the economy in percentage
deviations from the ‘No Aid Steady State’.
In contrast to the ‘Benchmark’ scenario, the tax cuts implemented by the
government are minor for all values of α. Instead, foreign aid funds are used
to increase government consumption. This effect is especially emphasized
in less democratic regimes, i.e. for low values of α. Remarkably, household
consumption increases though decreased tax rates should foster the incentive
to invest in capital. However, realizing that foreign aid will only be given
for few periods, households anticipate that the tax rate will quickly return
to its initial ‘No Aid Steady State’ value. Therefore, households use the
temporary higher income to increase consumption. This turns out to be
optimal particularly in the least benevolent political regime, α = 0.3. Here,
due to low investment the capital stock decreases in the first periods. In the
long-run all variables return to their ‘No Aid Steady State’ values (see Panel
III of Table 3).
It is evident that the impact of transferring aid unconditionally is low
and only temporary. Foreign aid funds are consumed by the government
and by the households who decrease investments. The limited effectiveness
is highlighted in Panel II of Table 4 that summarizes the welfare gain and
the costs of aid. Obviously, since foreign aid transfers are the same as in the
‘Benchmark’ scenario, the costs remain unchanged. Imposing no conditions
on aid yields minor welfare gains equivalent to increasing ‘No Aid Steady
State’ consumption by 0.05 to 0.09 percent. The welfare gain is the lowest
in the least benevolent political regime though it receives the largest amount
of aid.
Since ‘Aid Policy A’ is characterized by temporary development assis-
tance, assume that the donor unconditionally transfers aid funds as shown
in Figure 4 to which we refer as ’Aid Policy B’.4 Qualitatively ‘Aid Policy
4Here we take ‘Aid Policy B’ as exogenously given. However, ‘Aid Policy B’ is the
outcome of the maximization problem (26) which is explained in detail in Section 5.4.
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B’ is the same strategy as ‘Aid Policy A’: the donor transfers high amounts
of aid in the early periods in order to stimulate the economy. In contrast to
‘Aid Policy A’, here the donor pays larger amounts and decreases foreign aid
over time to a permanent level of assistance. Note that in the long-run the
three economies get the same amount of aid and that only in the short-run
the poorer economies are compensated for their low initial capital stocks.
Figure 4 displays the tax policy by the government and the reactions of the
economy as percentage deviations from the ‘No Aid Steady State’.
In this scenario unconditional aid does have a permanent effect, yet, the
long-run tax cuts implemented by the recipient government are rather low.
Remarkably, the tax reductions are lower in less benevolent political regimes.
As an example consider the non-democratic regime described by α = 0.3.
The donor transfers the largest amount of aid in return to the lowest tax
cut of less than three percentage points, though the initial ‘No Aid Steady
State’ tax level is the highest of the three economies considered here. Instead
of weakening the tax distortion, the government uses foreign aid to increase
its government consumption. The tax cut has some positive effect on the
investment behavior of the households, such that production and household
consumption increase compared to the ‘No Aid Steady State’. However, the
impact of foreign aid on the private sector of the developing economy is
small as opposed to the impact on the government sector. Panel IV of Table
3 summarizes the steady state of ‘Aid Policy B’ if funds are unconditionally
transferred. The steady state capital stock can be increased for all politi-
cal regimes, but, as argued before, the increase is low given the large aid
transfers. Moreover, the main characteristics remain unchanged compared
to the ‘No Aid Steady State’. In particular for α = 0.3 tax rates are ex-
tremely high, financing a government consumption share that is larger than
the private consumption share.
The welfare effects are summarized in Panel III of Table 4. Compared to
‘Aid Policy A’ in the ‘Benchmark’ scenario, higher amounts of development
assistance produce higher costs while the welfare gain of the households is
still rather low. Even for the country with the most benevolent government
the welfare gain is equivalent to increasing ‘No Aid Steady State’ consump-
tion by only about 5 percent. Nevertheless, the results indicate that aid
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effectiveness is higher in environments with ‘good’ economic policies if funds
are unconditionally transferred.
5.4 Conditional Aid Policy
The effectiveness of unconditional aid has turned out to be rather low. The
implication for donors is either to reduce development assistance or to impose
conditions on aid funds with the purpose of ensuring the implementation
of economic policies that coincide with the donor’s intention. This section
analyzes the impact of conditional foreign aid on the recipient’s economy and
examines the enforceability of the conditions.
We start by considering ‘Aid Policy A’ once again and interpret aid con-
ditionality as follows. The donor offers to transfer foreign aid at and, in
return, expects the recipient government to implement the fiscal policy ac-
tion τt as shown in Figure 2. In order to enforce the conditions, the donor
threatens with a permanent aid cutoff if the government does not honor
the aid contract. The recipient government fulfills the conditions if, at








j[αu(c̃h,t+j) + (1 − α)v(c̃g,t+j)]. Since ‘Aid Policy A’ de-
mands tax cuts such that cg,t = 0, obviously, the recipient’s government has
no incentive to keep the conditions. If the donor continues the aid payments,
the developing economy will evolve as shown in Figure 3. If the donor de-
cides to permanently stop development assistance, the developing economy
remains in its ‘No Aid Steady State’.
Figure 4 has shown that the impact of permanent aid as described by ‘Aid
Policy B’ is low if funds are unconditionally transferred. Now assume that the
donor is aware of government distortions in the recipient country and knows
that tax cuts implying cg,t = 0 are not enforceable. Suppose the donor designs
aid conditionality that corresponds to the following maximization problem:
max
{ch,t, kt, cg,t, at}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βt[u(ch,t) + h(at) + ŵ v(cg,t)] (26)
s.t.
(6), (7) and (8).
ŵ is a constant relative weight given to v(cg,t). It is important to see that the
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donor does not account for different political regimes in this scenario. The so-
lution to the maximization problem is an allocation {ch,t(ŵ), cg,t(ŵ), kt(ŵ)}∞t=0
and policy actions {at(ŵ), τt(ŵ)}∞t=0 dependent on ŵ. This can be interpreted
as conditions on foreign aid funds: the donor offers to transfer at(ŵ) at time
t and, in return, expects the recipient government to implement the fiscal
policy action τt(ŵ). However, by assigning the weight ŵ, the donor does ac-
cept some government consumption in the recipient economy. We choose the
relative weight ŵ = 0.25, such that foreign aid flows correspond to those of
‘Aid Policy B’. The left Panels of Figure 5 show the tax cuts that the donor
expects the recipient’s government to implement. Tax reductions are condi-
tioned to be about 14, 30 and 45 percentage points for α = 0.7, α = 0.5 and
α = 0.3, respectively. Apparently, aid conditionality forces non-democratic
governments to implement the highest tax decreases in percentage points.
It is essential to check whether these conditions are enforceable. The last
graph of the left Panels of Figure 5 focuses on the enforcement constraint
(11) which is neglected by the donor when designing conditionality according
to the maximization problem given in (26). If D(kt−1)−C(kt−1) is positive,
the conditions imposed on foreign aid flows are not enforceable. In this case
it is better for the government to break the aid contract and to forgo aid pay-
ments given that sovereignty insures that the capital stock cannot be seized
by the donor. It is evident that for α = 0.5 and α = 0.3 the incentive to
default on the aid contract is strongly positive. This implies that the allo-
cation and policy proposed by the donor is not supportable and will not be
implemented by the recipient government. Depending on the behavior of the
donor, the recipient economy will either evolve as shown in Figure 4 or stay
in the ‘No Aid Steady State’. Considering α = 0.7, it turns out that the
value of implementing the tax cut is larger than not fulfilling the conditions,
i.e. aid conditionality is enforceable. However, since the D(kt−1)−C(kt−1) is
strictly negative, in principle, the donor could demand stronger conditions.
This implies that for α = 0.7 ‘Aid Policy B’ and the corresponding conditions
are not optimal.
To design optimal conditional foreign aid policy, the donor takes into
account the enforcement constraint (11) and solves the full maximization
problem given in (10). Given the political regime, at any point in time, the
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optimal aid contract is self-enforcing: the recipient government is worse off
without development assistance, i.e. the threat of a permanent cutoff from
aid is severe. Hence, the government implements the conditions, i.e the tax
cuts, in return to foreign aid funds. The right Panels of Figure 5 plot the
key variables of optimal conditional aid to which we refer as ‘Aid Policy C’.
First note that the general pattern of foreign aid funds is the same as be-
fore: initially the donor transfers high aid funds to stimulate the economy on
its transition path to the new steady state. Yet, the quantitative properties
are different for different political regimes: less benevolent receive perma-
nently larger aid funds. To understand this, first focus on the last graph
that shows the evolution of the co-state variable µt over time. Remember
that µt measures the binding pattern of the enforcement constraint and that
D(kt−1) is increasing with the capital stock. Due to foreign aid funds, capital
grows to its new steady state value. To fulfill the enforcement constraint, µt
increases during the early periods and then reaches its steady state value.
Note that there is a jump increase in t = 0. Let wt be the relative weight





wt depends on µt and shows the same pattern. In contrast to ‘Aid Policy
B’, the relative weight is endogenous rather than exogenous. In comparison
with ‘Aid Policy B’, it is evident that for α = 0.3 and α = 0.5 the donor
has to put a larger relative weight on the utility of the government to satisfy
enforceability. This implies that the donor has to permanently pay larger
amounts of foreign aid in return to higher government consumption. More-
over, for α = 0.3, the tax cuts are lower. In contrast, considering α = 0.7,
‘Aid Policy C’ assigns a lower relative weight to v(cg,t) than ‘Aid Policy B’
and demands larger tax cuts.
Figure 6 shows the tax policy and the responses of the economy in percent-
age deviations from the ‘No Aid Steady State’. It is evident that the large
tax cuts strongly stimulate capital accumulation and household consump-
tion increases. The percentage deviations from the ‘No Aid Steady State’
are largest for economies that suffer from non-democratic political regimes.
E.g. in case of α = 0.3 the capital stock and household consumption have
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more than doubled compared to the ‘No Aid Steady State’. However, in those
economies tax cuts and the reduction of government consumption in percent-
age deviations are the lowest, i.e. large parts of government consumption are
financed by aid.
In the long-run all variables reach a new steady state which is summarized
in Panel V of Table 3. In the steady state taxes are reduced to fairly low
levels such that the capital stock and production increase considerably. This
is accompanied by increased private consumption. Note that for α = 0.3
foreign aid payments are the highest and help to decrease the size of the
government sector, such that the government consumption share is smaller
than the private consumption share.
The positive impact of self-enforcing conditional aid is reflected in the wel-
fare gain summarized in Panel IV of Table 4. The welfare gain is equivalent
to raising ‘No Aid Steady State’ consumption up to 24 percent. Compared
with ‘Aid Policy B’ that was unconditionally designed, the welfare gain for
α = 0.3 is multiplied approximately by the factor ten while the costs are
approximately tripled. Note that the welfare gain shows a hump shape in α:
for α = 0.5 the gain is larger than for α = 0.3 and α = 0.7. For α = 0.3 we
have seen that the non-democratic government wastes a considerable amount
of foreign aid for non-productive government consumption. For α = 0.7 dis-
tortions are already low in the ‘No Aid Steady State’, such that the economy
works quite efficiently without aid.
5.5 Aid Policy and a Sudden Political Regime Switch
So far we have assumed that the political regime in the recipient country
is constant over time. In this section we address the question how foreign
aid policy should respond to a sudden switch of the political regime. As
initial situation we consider an economy without government distortions that
is located on the transition path with a capital stock equal to 40 percent
of its steady state value. Assume that a sudden political regime switch
takes place and that a new government introduces income taxes to finance
non-productive government consumption. We analyze the evolution of the
developing economy if no aid is given and how self-enforcing conditional aid
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should be optimally designed if the intention is to increase the welfare of the
poor.
Figure 7 plots foreign aid, the associated tax policy, capital, household
and government consumption on the transition path. First, consider politi-
cal regimes associated with α = 0.5 and α = 0.7. If no aid is given, in the
long-run, the income tax rates are 39 and 24 percent to finance government
consumption shares of 39 and 24 percent, respectively. Since higher tax rates
lower the incentives to invest in capital, the economies converge to a lower
steady state compared to the one that would have occurred without govern-
ment distortions. Now consider the non-democratic political regime, α = 0.3,
that is characterized by a government consumption share that is larger than
the private consumption share if no aid is given. The government raises high
income taxes, such that investments strongly decrease. Government distor-
tions are so severe that the economy converges to a new steady state capital
stock that is below the initial one.
Given the political regime, what are the characteristics of optimal self-
enforcing conditional aid? For α = 0.5 and α = 0.7 optimal foreign aid shows
the same pattern as before: initially, large transfers are given to stimulate the
economy. For α = 0.7, the tax rate is initially below zero, such that subsidies
are given to the households. The economy grows quickly and converges to
a steady state that is similar to the ‘Benchmark’ aid policy. For α = 0.5,
the tax can be substantially reduced and capital and household consumption
increase considerably. Consider the non-democratic political regime, α = 0.3.
Interestingly, optimal self-enforcing foreign aid shows a hump shape in the
early periods. To understand this remember that the initial capital stock
is above the ‘No Aid Steady State’. Because a permanent cutoff from aid
does not pose a severe threat, the recipient government has low incentives to
implement tax policies as proposed by the donor. The enforcement constraint
is strongly binding in t = 0, such that the jump increase in µ0 is very large.
In order to ensure enforceability, the donor has to transfer high amounts
of foreign aid which increase the capital stock in the economy. However,
since sovereignty of the recipient ensures that the capital stock cannot be
seized by the donor, the increasing capital stock makes aid sanctions even
less severe. The consequence is that the donor has to increase aid funds even
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more. At some point, µt is so large that government consumption is high
enough and foreign aid can be slowly reduced. These results show that there
exist scenarios where foreign aid policy increases the recipient’s incentives to
follow ‘bad’ economic policies. Yet, self-enforcing conditional aid does help
to increase the welfare of the poor: the declining transition path is turned
into an increasing one and household consumption rises substantially.
6 Conclusions
This paper has analyzed how foreign aid should be optimally designed. Using
a neoclassical framework that accounts for different political regimes, it has
been argued that recipient governments may not implement economic policies
that coincide with the donors’ intention. We have modelled aid conditional-
ity as imperfectly enforceable contract between the donor and the recipient
government that specifies the allocation of aid funds. Aid conditionality has
been assumed to be supportable by the threat of a permanent aid cutoff.
We have found that unconditional aid works better in environments with
‘good’ economic policies. However, in all political regimes, aid effectiveness is
rather low if no conditions are imposed. In contrast, self-enforcing conditional
aid strongly stimulates the economy and increases the welfare of the poor.
The enforceability has turned out to be crucial for the effectiveness of foreign
aid funds.
Optimal self-enforcing conditional aid appears to be critically dependent
on the political regime in the recipient country. In our theoretical frame-
work, to reduce poverty, the donor transfers permanently the largest aid
funds to the least benevolent government and, in return, has to accept the
highest tax rates and the highest government consumption. If aid funds are
not sufficiently high, the recipient government has no incentives to keep the
conditions and aid effectiveness is low.
It is debatable whether donors should pursue this foreign aid policy. How-
ever, if the donor decides to provide development assistant to a country that
suffers from a non-democratic political regime and the intention is to reduce
poverty, then the donor has no other choice than accepting such a deal with
the recipient government. Otherwise foreign aid funds are very likely to be
wasted.
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The major policy implication of this paper is that donors need to be aware
of the political regimes in the recipient countries and carefully account for in-
centives when designing aid conditionality. Importantly, a lot of effort should
be allocated to verifying whether the imposed conditions are implemented by
the recipient governments. In case of default, aid agencies should be highly
selective in the allocation of future aid funds among recipient countries in
order to maintain credibility.
This research can be extended in different ways. It might be interesting
to analyze the connection of aid and trade policies since developing countries
are small open economies. Moreover, it seems to be promising to take into
account that developing countries are highly indebted. Another avenue of
research is to introduce several recipient countries in order to model aid
selectivity. All these points are, however, left for future research.
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Figure 1: Growth Performance and Foreign Aid in Africa












































Notes: The left panel refers to the average of per capita GDP in 32 African
countries individually listed in Table 1. GDP has been converted into constant US
$, 2000 = 100. The right panel refers to the average of foreign aid as a percentage
fraction of GDP of 35 African countries listed in Table 1. Foreign aid is measured
by total net Official Development Assistance.
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Table 1: Official Development Assistance (ODA) as Fraction of GDP in %
and Growth, 1972-2000
ODA Total Net ODA Grants GDP Growth
All Multi. All Multi.
Recipient Donors Donors Donors Donors abs. per Cap.
Benin 10.06 4.31 7.25 2.03 1.84 -0.80
Botswana 8.68 1.78 6.80 1.33 7.47 4.15
Burkina Faso 15.45 5.35 12.77 3.27 0.84 -1.65
Burundi 15.67 7.58 12.15 4.48 -1.50 -3.33
Cameroon 4.04 1.17 2.57 0.57 1.70 -0.87
Central Afr. Rep. 13.27 5.12 10.90 3.02 0.36 -1.94
Chad 13.09 5.83 10.52 3.49 -0.15 -2.68
Congo 6.62 1.44 4.87 0.84 2.51 -0.51
Cote d’Ivoire 4.38 1.45 2.74 0.64 0.77 -2.78
Egypt 6.12 0.80 3.83 0.27 3.57 1.48
Gabon 2.11 0.34 1.88 0.31 3.72 2.95
Gambia 6.07 2.94 3.16 0.64 – –
Ghana 25.65 11.44 18.74 5.85 – –
Guinea Bissau 24.63 9.26 17.86 5.06 – –
Kenya 7.65 2.36 5.36 0.90 0.83 -2.38
Lesotho 20.54 8.35 17.16 8.35 3.19 0.93
Madagascar 9.25 3.69 6.57 1.48 -0.24 -3.02
Malawi 20.36 9.97 13.52 4.46 -1.22 -4.27
Mali 18.47 7.01 13.71 3.79 1.77 -0.88
Mauritius 2.75 0.84 1.87 0.59 4.89 3.65
Morocco 2.91 0.42 1.46 0.29 1.76 -0.32
Niger 13.82 5.52 11.64 3.01 -0.59 -3.84
Nigeria 0.32 0.12 0.23 0.08 -1.43 -3.17
Rwanda 17.21 6.75 14.59 4.42 -0.32 -2.63
Senegal 11.16 3.40 8.34 1.49 0.00 -2.56
Seychelles 8.89 1.54 6.96 1.16 – –
Sierra Leone 12.85 6.15 8.68 2.83 -2.65 -4.21
Swaziland 6.27 2.20 5.01 1.74 3.02 0.52
Tanzania 15.38 4.16 12.34 1.58 1.15 -2.02
Togo 10.07 4.05 7.51 1.82 -0.39 -3.09
Tunisia 2.72 0.52 1.50 0.35 2.60 0.50
Zambia 29.99 11.50 20.08 2.90 – –
Mean 11.45 4.29 8.52 2.29 1.24 -1.21
Median 10.07 3.87 7.38 1.66 0.84 -1.94
Notes: Data are annual from the IMF and OECD. The sample period is
1972 to 2000. Entries are mean values. For Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau,
Seychelles and Zambia data are not available for the whole period.
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Table 2: Gastil Index: 1972-2001
Recipient 1972 1982 1992 2001
Benin 7.50 7.50 2.30 3.20
Botswana 3.40 2.30 1.20 2.20
Burkina Faso 3.40 6.50 5.50 4.40
Burundi 7.70 6.60 6.50 6.60
Cameroon 6.40 6.60 6.60 6.60
Central Afr. Rep. 7.70 7.50 6.50 6.50
Chad 6.70 6.70 6.60 6.60
Congo 7.60 6.70 6.50 6.60
Cote d’Ivoire 7.60 6.70 6.40 5.40
Egypt 6.60 5.50 5.60 6.60
Gabon 6.60 5.50 5.60 6.60
Gambia 2.20 3.30 1.20 5.50
Ghana 6.60 6.50 5.50 2.30
Guinea Bissau - 6.60 6.50 4.50
Kenya 5.40 5.50 4.50 6.50
Lesotho 7.40 5.50 6.40 4.40
Madagascar 5.30 5.50 4.40 2.40
Malawi 7.60 7.60 2.30 2.30
Mali 7.60 7.60 2.30 2.30
Mauritius 3.20 2.20 2.20 1.20
Morocco 5.40 4.50 6.50 5.50
Niger 6.60 7.60 5.40 4.40
Nigeria 6.40 2.30 5.40 4.50
Rwanda 7.60 6.40 6.50 7.60
Senegal 6.60 4.40 4.30 3.40
Seychelles - 6.60 6.40 3.30
Sierra Leone 4.50 5.50 7.60 4.50
Swaziland 4.20 5.50 6.50 6.50
Tanzania 6.60 6.60 6.50 5.50
Togo 7.50 7.60 6.50 5.50
Tunisia 6.50 5.50 6.50 6.50
Zambia 5.50 5.60 2.30 5.40
Notes: Data is from the House of Freedom.
Countries with score 1-2.5, 3.5-5.5 and 5.5-7 are
rated as ‘free’, ‘partly free’ and ‘not free’, respec-
tively.
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Table 3: Steady State Values








I ft = 0 ∀ t
α = 0.7 0 0.24 1.79 0.66 0.26 - 0 0.60 0.24
α = 0.5 0 0.39 1.28 0.48 0.39 - 0 0.48 0.39
α = 0.3 0 0.55 0.83 0.31 0.48 - 0 0.35 0.55
Benchmark
II Aid Policy A
α = 0.7
α = 0.5 0 0 2.62 0.98 0 - 0 0.79 0
α = 0.3
Unconditional Aid
III Aid Policy A
α = 0.7 0 0.24 1.79 0.66 0.26 - 0 0.60 0.24
α = 0.5 0 0.39 1.28 0.48 0.39 - 0 0.48 0.39
α = 0.3 0 0.55 0.83 0.31 0.48 - 0 0.35 0.55
Unconditional Aid
IV Aid Policy B
α = 0.7 0.08 0.19 1.95 0.72 0.29 - 0.07 0.64 0.26
α = 0.5 0.08 0.36 1.40 0.52 0.44 - 0.08 0.51 0.43
α = 0.3 0.08 0.53 0.90 0.34 0.55 - 0.09 0.37 0.61
Self-Enforcing Conditional Aid
V Aid Policy C
α = 0.7 0.10 0.03 2.53 0.94 0.13 0.69 0.08 0.76 0.11
α = 0.5 0.12 0.12 2.20 0.82 0.26 0.96 0.10 0.70 0.22
α = 0.3 0.14 0.23 1.82 0.68 0.39 1.20 0.12 0.61 0.35
Notes: a, τ , k, ch, cg and µ denote steady state values of aid, tax, capital,
household consumption, government consumption and the co-state variable,
respectively.
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I Aid Policy A
α = 0.7 27.15 -0.001
α = 0.5 35.29 -0.002
α = 0.3 36.31 -0.006
Unconditional Aid
II Aid Policy A
α = 0.7 0.09 -0.001
α = 0.5 0.06 -0.002
α = 0.3 0.05 -0.006
Unconditional Aid
III Aid Policy B
α = 0.7 5.22 -1.24
α = 0.5 3.78 -1.29
α = 0.3 2.24 -1.38
Conditional Aid
IV Aid Policy C
α = 0.7 21.33 -2.04
α = 0.5 24.03 -2.82
α = 0.3 23.30 -3.77
Notes: Welfare gains are measured
in terms of percentage deviation
in certainty-equivalence consump-
tion relative to the ‘No Aid Steady
State’. Cost of foreign aid is given
by h(at). The initial capital stock is
assumed to be the ‘No Aid Steady
State’ capital stock.
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Figure 2: Benchmark: Aid Policy A
















































































































































































Notes: This figure shows optimal foreign aid policy and its effectiveness given that
the donor is able to enforce cg,t = 0 ∀ t. The initial capital stock is assumed to
be the ‘No Aid Steady State’ capital stock. Percentage deviations from the ‘No
Aid Steady State’ are presented for the tax, household consumption, government
consumption, capital and production.
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Figure 3: Effectiveness of Unconditional Aid: Aid Policy A




















































































































































































Notes: This figure shows ‘Aid Policy A’ and its effectiveness if funds are uncon-
ditionally transferred given that there are government distortions in the recipient
economy. The initial capital stock is assumed to be the ‘No Aid Steady State’
capital stock. Percentage deviations from the ‘No Aid Steady State’ are presented
for the tax, household consumption, government consumption, capital and pro-
duction.
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Figure 4: Effectiveness of Unconditional Aid: Aid Policy B



















































































































































































Notes: This figure shows ‘Aid Policy B’ and its effectiveness if funds are uncon-
ditionally transferred given that there are government distortions in the recipient
economy. The initial capital stock is assumed to be the ‘No Aid Steady State’
capital stock. Percentage deviations from the ‘No Aid Steady State’ are presented
for the tax, household consumption, government consumption, capital and pro-
duction.
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Figure 5: Non-Enforceable and Self-Enforcing Conditional Aid Policies
Aid Policy B Aid Policy C


























































































































































Notes: This figure shows ‘Aid Policy B’ and ‘Aid Policy C’ and the correspond-
ing conditional tax cuts. ‘Aid Policy B’ is characterized by an exogenous rela-
tive weight wt = ŵ while ‘Aid Policy C’ is characterized by an endogenous rel-
ative weight wt = ((1 − α)µt)/(1 + αµt). C(kt−1) =
∑∞
j=0 β
j [α u(ch,t+j) + (1 −
α) v(cg,t+j)], D(kt−1) =
∑∞
j=0 β
j [α u(c̃h,t+j) + (1 − α) v(c̃g,t+j)]. µt is the addi-
tional co-state variable that ensures that C(kt−1) ≤ D(kt−1). The initial capital
stock is assumed to be the ‘No Aid Steady State’ capital stock.
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Figure 6: Effectiveness of Self-Enforcing Conditional Aid: Aid Policy C
























































































































































































Notes: This figure shows ‘Aid Policy C’ and its effectiveness if funds are condi-
tionally transferred given that there are government distortions in the recipient
economy. The initial capital stock is assumed to be the ‘No Aid Steady State’
capital stock. Percentage deviations from the ‘No Aid Steady State’ are presented
for the tax, household consumption, government consumption, capital and pro-
duction.
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Figure 7: Political Regime Switch and Optimal Foreign Aid Policy
α = 0.3 α = 0.5 α = 0.7







































































































































































































































Notes: This figure shows the transition to the steady state given an initial capital
stock k−1 = 1.05 which corresponds to 40 % of the steady state capital stock if
cg,t = 0 and at = 0 ∀t. ‘Benchmark’ refers to ‘Aid Policy A’ while ‘Conditional
Aid’ refers to ‘Aid Policy C’.
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